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Abstract 
The purpose of this project is to define self-sufficiency as it relates to the 
Marine Corps, identify the primary elements of self-sufficiency, and describe the 
interrelationships among these elements. Upon reviewing applicable literature, we 
found three primary elements of self-sufficiency: environment, time, and supply 
chain. After analyzing these elements and their interrelationships, we present a 
framework of self-sufficiency that (1) Marine Corps units can apply to internally 
increase their self-sufficiency and (2) others can use to conduct further in-depth 
research on how to increase or optimize Marine Corps units’ self-sufficiency. 
Keywords: Self-sufficiency, supply chain, Marine Corps, environment, time, 
sustainment, expeditionary energy 
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The definition of self-sufficiency is highly dependent on context. The Marine 
Corps expeditionary energy literature has popularized the term self-sufficiency in 
recent years. However, what does it truly mean to be self-sufficient? In each 
instance, the term could have a different meaning depending on the person who is 
asked. How do we put a definition to one term that applies to many different 
situations? (It is a question that we continually struggled with in the process of this 
research.) This question is the focus and driving factor for this paper. 
B. RESEARCH PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
1. Define self-sufficiency as it relates to the Marine Corps. 
2. Identify and define the elements of self-sufficiency. 
3. Analyze elements of self-sufficiency and their interdependence. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How does one define self-sufficiency? 
2. How does self-sufficiency relate to the Marine Corps? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this project is limited to defining self-sufficiency as it relates to 
the Marine Corps. It encompasses a selective literature review and personal 
experiences of the authors to determine the factors that influence the Marine Corps’ 
ability to be self-sufficient during military operations. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This project utilizes a selective review of Marine Corps doctrine and literature 
to define self-sufficiency. Using our own personal military experiences, we then 
analyze the information provided in the literature review and apply it to the current 
operating environment of the Marine Corps. 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT 
In Chapter I, we introduced our research topic by explaining our motivation, 
research objectives, research questions, scope of our research, and methodology. In 
Chapter II, we briefly discuss the background related to self-sufficiency. In Chapter 
III, we provide a selective literature review. In Chapter IV, we analyze the information 
from the literature review, identify trends, and use those trends to provide a 
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framework of self-sufficiency that can be generally applied to the Marine Corps. 
Finally, in Chapter V, we attempt to define self-sufficiency as it applies to Marine 
Corps operations and identify further research opportunities. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
At the Marine Corps Energy Summit in 2009, then Commandant of the Marine 
Corps (CMC) General James Conway made expeditionary energy the top priority for 
the Marine Corps. Throughout the Marine Corps’ analysis on minimizing the need for 
liquid logistics, the scope of the conversation grew to include increasing self-
sufficiency for the Marine Corps. Currently, self-sufficiency is highly dependent on 
fuel and water requirements, because of their influence on day-to-day operations, 
and on supply lines to meet these needs. But what happens when the theater of 
operations changes? The ability of the Marine Corps to decrease the vulnerability of 
its supply lines requires an increase in the self-sufficiency of its Marines and 
ultimately its units. That is, the less reliant that Marines are on external support 
requirements, the less strain and vulnerability that exists on the supply chain. 
As often happens with requirement generators, they envision a specific end 
state, but it is difficult to put into words how to achieve that end state. The term used 
to describe this end state is self-sufficiency. But what is self-sufficiency? What are 
the factors that influence it? How does one measure self-sufficiency? To what 
context is this term being applied? 
These questions are a basis for this project, in which we attempt to define the 
term self-sufficiency. In doing so, we plan to improve understanding of this term, 
aiding others to improve practices within military logistics through a common 
understanding. 
In this project, we use three perspectives to build a framework for defining 
self-sufficiency: environment, time, and supply chain. We chose these perspectives 
because they are commonly associated within applicable literature. We further 
expound on these perspectives within our analysis. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides the knowledge necessary to analyze and assist 
in defining self-sufficiency. The review incorporates Marine Corps doctrine as the 
baseline understanding of how the Marine Corps operates and logistically sustains 
its units. Figure 1 outlines the organization of the literature review. The first 
subsection in the review looks at how the Marine Corps operates to frame the nature 
and conditions levied upon Marines. Due to the relationship between self-sufficiency 
and logistics, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 4, Logistics, is the source 
of much of this portion of the literature review. 
 
Figure 1. Representation of the Literature Review 
After studying Marine Corps doctrine, we present the next subsection, which 
covers the Marine Corps literature. The subsection offers an overview of the current 
literature that has emphasized self-sufficiency within the Marine Corps. Most of this 
literature deals with the use of resources at the tactical level and how they affect the 
operational and strategic levels. Most of the literature reviewed in this subsection 
comes from recent discussions on energy and water efficiencies. 
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A. MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE 
Marine Corps doctrine is a forum for ideals that the organization holds. It is 
not directive in nature but more of a case study of past experience and lessons 
learned that can be easily applied in today’s environment. It talks in broad terms to 
help Marines understand the cultural aspects of the functional areas of the Marine 
Corps that traditionally stand the test of time. Doctrine is a place to find the spirit of 
an idea or concept. One will not find a direct definition in doctrine but rather a 
framework that incorporates ideas for success (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 
1997b). The central theme of Marine Corps doctrine is the idea of being 
expeditionary and applying the concept of maneuver warfare. Based on the concept 
of maneuver warfare, one can derive the specific concept of logistically supporting 
and sustaining the force in the Marine Corps. 
1. Expeditionary Identity 
In MCDP 1, Warfighting, the Marine Corps hailed itself as the “expeditionary 
force in readiness” ready “for immediate employment in any clime and place and in 
any type of conflict” (USMC, 1997b, p. 53). This is equally a statement of its 
capability and of the culture of Marines. This concept of expeditiousness 
encompasses a broad range of environments within which the Marine Corps will 
operate. From amphibious, combat, humanitarian, and up and down the spectrum of 
conflict, Marines must be ready at a moment’s notice to operate and execute within 
an array of situations. This framework is the bedrock for training Marine forces in 
being flexible, responsive, and aware of requirements for each situation. 
2. Maneuver Warfare 
Per MCDP 1, “maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to 
shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected 
actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the 
enemy cannot cope” (USMC, 1997b, p. 73). Different from the force-on-force fighting 
of attrition warfare, maneuver warfare does not strike at the enemy’s strength. It 
focuses on using space to maneuver fighting units into an advantageous position to 
attack the enemy’s weakness. Speed, focus, and surprise are key elements to the 
success of maneuver warfare (USMC, 1997b). Perhaps the most important element 
of maneuver warfare is that of leadership. A leader within maneuver warfare must be 
able to work in a decentralized command, understanding the intent of his or her 
higher command and in congruence with the larger situation (USMC, 1997a). 
3. Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
Because the success of Marine Corps operations depends on its ability to 
operate in any clime and environment and respond to any situation, the Marine 
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Corps organizes its units using the concept of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF). A MAGTF is a task-organized unit “consisting of ground, aviation, combat 
service support (logistics) and command elements” (USMC, 1997b, p. 55). The 
strength of this concept is in its ability to give a single commander the combined 
arms forces that can be tailored to specific situations (USMC, 1997b). Although the 
MAGTF has the ability to tailor a force to a specific situation, the organization 
“should be organized for warfighting first and then adapted to peacetime rather than 
vice versa” (USMC, 1997b, p. 55). The basic organization chart for a MAGTF can be 
seen in Figure 2. The core elements of a MAGTF are the command element (CE), 
aviation combat element (ACE), ground combat element (GCE), and combat service 
support element (CSSE; USMC, 2000). 
 
Figure 2. Organizational Chart Outlining the Core Elements of the Marine 
Corps MAGTF 
(USMC, 2000, p. 2-3) 
There are five typical MAGTFs that the Marine Corps utilizes to conduct 
operations: Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
(MEB), Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF), and 
air contingency MAGTF (USMC, 2000). To understand how the Marine Corps 
operates and sustains its force, one must understand these five organizations. 
a. Marine Expeditionary Force 
A MEF is the largest and principal warfighting organization of the 
Marine Corps. It is used for larger operations and contingencies and is capable of 
executing all missions across the range of military operations (ROMO; USMC, 
2002). It is centered on a permanent CE and is usually composed of one or more 
Marine force service support groups (FSSGs) as the CSSE, a Marine division as the 
GCE, and a Marine aircraft wing (MAW) as the ACE. A MEF can operate from sea or 
land (USMC, 2000). A MEF carries enough supplies to be self-sufficient for 60 days 
of operations (USMC, 2002). The most recent use of a MEF was in combat 
operations in Iraq to cover the Al-Anbar province. 
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b. Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
A MEB is a medium-sized MAGTF that provides flexibility through its 
use of a reinforced Marine regiment as the GCE, a Marine air group (MAG) with both 
fixed- and rotary-winged assets as the ACE, and a brigade service support group 
(BSSG) as the CSSE. A MEB is smaller than a MEF but larger than a MEU. A MEB 
CE is commanded by a general officer and has the capability of 30 days of organic 
self-sustainment (USMC, 2000). 
c. Marine Expeditionary Unit 
A MEU uses a reinforced infantry battalion (which forms a battalion 
landing team [BLT]) as the core element, along with a reinforced helicopter squadron 
as the ACE and a MEU service support group (MSSG) as the CSSE (USMC, 2000, 
2002). A MEU is utilized as a forward sea-based deployment requirement, allowing it 
to double as an immediate reaction capability in crisis response situations (USMC, 
2002). A MEU is a key capability for national security due to the forward presence 
that MEUs give. MEUs carry 15 days of supply (DOS), which allows them to be self-
sufficient for a shorter amount of time than a MEB or MEF but requires less time to 
execute missions due to their size (USMC, 2002). 
d. Special Purpose MAGTF 
A SPMAGTF is different from other MAGTFs—not in size but in its 
mission. A SPMAGTF is formed, trained, equipped, and task-organized to conduct 
missions of limited scope and duration (USMC, 2002). An example of a SPMAGTF 
is SPMAGTF HAITI, which conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to 
the earthquake-ravaged country. 
e. Air Contingency MAGTF 
“An air contingency MAGTF is an on-call, combat ready MAGTF that deploys 
by airlift” (USMC, 2002, p. 2-7). The size of an air contingency MAGTF varies due to 
the mission requirements and available airlift capacity. Due to transportation 
restraints, air contingency MAGTFs are limited to organic logistical support and 
require operational logistics support. 
f. Summary of MAGTFs 
The Marine Corps fights in modular-type organizations that are able to 
“right fit” to meet mission requirements. It is important to understand this structure to 
understand or shape a framework of self-sufficiency within the Marine Corps. Due to 
the interoperability of units within a MAGTF, the logistical support required to sustain 
a MAGTF is expanded from supporting one specific type of unit (GCE, ACE, CE, or 
CSSE) to supporting all units simultaneously. 
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4. History of Logistics 
In a military sense, self-sufficiency is deeply rooted in the realm of logistics. 
MCDP 4 provides a clear and detailed description of the history of logistics 
throughout the history of the Marine Corps. 
a. Pre-Modern Armies 
Prior to the 17th century, pre-modern armies needed little in the sense 
of logistical support because most members brought their own weapons and means 
of mobility (USMC, 1997a). Main concerns of the time were mostly limited to 
subsistence, which was fulfilled by foraging and local procurement (USMC, 1997a). 
Self-sufficiency during this time could be summarized into two categories: that of the 
individual and that of the unit. Individual self-sufficiency during the pre-modern era 
was determined by the supplies that the individual brought to the battle (weapons, a 
horse, and clothing). Unit self-sufficiency was determined by its ability to feed an 
army. 
b. Modern Armies 
The 17th and 18th centuries brought about a new type of warfare, 
necessitating the integration of logistics. The introduction of gunpowder and 
firearms, and the discouraging of pillaging and foraging, brought about the need for 
armies to be self-sufficient (USMC, 1997a). Self-sufficient, in this sense, meant that 
all necessary supplies needed to be procured from within the organization 
specifically for the use of the military. This meant that the soldier did not need to 
bring his own supplies because the organization took greater responsibility to 
provide the necessary goods. The individual soldier was instead dependent on the 
organization. This is where we find the origins of the supply chains in the military. 
MCDP 4 (USMC, 1997a) best described this as follows: 
This led to the creation of a logistics system consisting of fixed 
supply points called magazines and large, unwieldy baggage 
trains. The logistics systems required to sustain an army at once 
became a key limiting factor and a major vulnerability. The need 
to establish magazines in advance of any campaign restricted 
strategic mobility, while the requirement to transport large 
quantities of provisions and other supplies inhibited tactical 
mobility. (p. 38) 
In the 17th and 18th centuries, logistics was becoming an ever-
increasing part of military operations. The additional logistical support requirements 
could assist in winning a war, or could be the reason for demise. More thought was 
being given as to how logistics could be used to militaries’ advantage. Timing and 
the environment were two big factors being considered. 
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c. Industrial Revolution 
The industrial revolution had a profound effect on military logistics and 
sustainability for numerous reasons. First, the mechanization of process allowed for 
mass production never witnessed before. Also, technology made weaponry more 
lethal. Coupled with the mass production of ammunition, technology provided armies 
with the ability to project force at a larger scale. Lastly, the development in 
transportation allowed for larger armies and supplies to be connected on land and at 
sea with relative ease. As MCDP 4 (USMC, 1997a) stated, “As a result of these 
innovations, military forces grew larger in size, could deliver unprecedented 
firepower, and were increasingly capable of rapid movements” (p. 39). 
The industrial revolution created a system to sustain the individual and 
the force with one process that met and managed all needs or requirements, from 
production until delivery to the end user. This was the beginning of the modern-day 
description of a supply chain. MCDP 4 (USMC, 1997a) referenced this as follows: 
The industrial revolution had transformed logistics from an 
important aspect of warfare to an essential prerequisite for the 
conduct of war. Mass armies consumed vast quantities of food, 
ammunition, and other supplies. Modern weapons and 
equipment created the need for new services such as 
maintenance and salvage as well as new commodities like fuel 
and spare parts. The management of rail and shipping networks 
became crucial to delivering forces to the battlefield and 
sustaining those forces once they arrived. Logistics 
consideration came to dominate the strategic and operational 
levels of war. The ability of a nation to translate industrial 
capability into military resources and its capacity to sustain the 
military effort became crucial factors in determining whether to 
go to war. (p. 39) 
One historical discovery is that as the military realized advances in 
technology, the necessary logistical support became just as important as the 
technology itself. Logistics was not just a process that was necessary for self-
sufficiency; it also involved the maintenance, salvaging, and disposal of items. Also, 
as more advances were made in technology, the individual would rely less on 
himself and more on the logistical system for needed resources to sustain him on 
the battlefield. 
5. Levels of Logistics 
Similar to operations, logistics is conducted in three levels: strategic, 
operational, and tactical. Each level plays an interrelated role in the conduct of 
logistics for a given campaign. Although scale may seem the differentiator between 
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the levels of logistics, it is their respective focus that differentiates them (USMC, 
1997a). 
a. Strategic-Level Logistics 
According to Marine Corps doctrine, strategic-level logistics is the 
highest level of logistical support. “Strategic logistics encompasses the nation’s 
ability to raise, deploy, and sustain operating forces in the execution of the national 
military strategy” (UMSC, 1997a, p. 49). The focus of strategic logistics is to sustain 
the entire force throughout all theaters of operations. Examples of strategic-level 
logistics include the development and purchase of major end items, such as weapon 
systems, recruitment, and installations. Within the context of a company structure, 
strategic logistics would be the top executive level.  
b. Operational-Level Logistics 
The operational level of logistics links the strategic and tactical levels 
of logistics. “Operational logistics addresses sustainment within a military theater of 
operations” (USMC, 1997a, p. 50). The main focus of operational logistics is to 
sustain a theater of operations or a specific campaign by making available the 
resources of the strategic logistics to the tactical commanders (USMC, 1997a). 
Operational logistics would equate to middle management within a company. 
c. Tactical-Level Logistics 
Tactical logistics is concerned with sustaining the force in combat and 
draws upon resources made available by the operational level (USMC, 1997a). The 
focus of tactical logistics is to provide necessary resources and services in support 
of operations. Common phrases about the tactical level include the “tip of the spear” 
and where “the rubber meets the road.” Tactical logistics is arguably the most 
important level of logistics because it is incumbent on each commander, regardless 
of their military occupational specialty (MOS), to provide organic resources for 
tactical-level logistics (USMC, 2000). Tactical logistics is also referred to as the “last 
tactical mile” of the logistics model.  
Tactical-level logistics is broken down into six functional areas 
necessary to sustain tactical units: supply, maintenance, transportation, general 
engineering, health services, and services. Resources from this level of logistics can 
be broken down into 10 classes of supply used to sustain military units conducting 
the six functions of logistics (USMC, 2000).  
The importance of the 10 classes of supply is that the supplies are 
tangible items that are needed to sustain tactical units. Both strategic and 
operational levels of logistics are focused on making these items available to the 
tactical-level units so that the units may carry out operations. 
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d. Relationships of Different Levels of Logistics 
Each level of logistics has a specific focus (see Figure 3) but relates to 
the level higher and lower. MCDP 4 (USMC, 1997a) stated that “strategic level 
logistics forms the foundation from which operational logistics enable and sustains 
tactical logistics” (p. 51). Although each level of logistics has a different focus, it is 
highly dependent upon the other levels; each level must provide what is required to 
ensure a more stable logistical support structure. 
 
Figure 3. Focus of Each Level of Logistics 
(USMC, 1997a, p. 52) 
Figure 4 is an excerpt from Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 4-
12, Operational-level Logistics, and helps one to better understand the interaction 
between the levels of logistics. As seen in the figure, requirements generated at the 
tactical level must be supported by the strategic level. All of these requirements are 
funneled through the operational level, which acts as an intermediary. 
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Figure 4. The Flow of Requirements and Support From the Different Levels 
of Logistics 
(USMC, 2002, p. 1-2) 
6. Emerging Trends 
Although MCDP 4 was written in 1997, it did have ideas on emerging trends 
in the battlespaces in which Marines will fight. It described five emerging trends that 
are different from the traditional operating environment that existed at the time of the 
publication’s release. The purpose of identifying these trends is to notify the 
logistician to prepare for the ever-changing face of warfare. Due to its foresight, 
MCDP 4 provided great planning considerations for the battlespaces of Iraq and 
Afghanistan that would ensue a few years later. These trends are important because 
they have been seen in the current battlespace, are still evolving, and will be seen in 
future operating environments. 
a. Expanding Battlespace 
Two technological advancements are expanding the battlespace as we 
know it. The first advancement is greater mobility. Mobility has allowed the military to 
travel greater distances faster (USMC, 1997a) and allows for greater distances 
between supply lines and operating forces, necessitating a greater focus on 
logistical planning.  
The second advancement that is expanding the battlespace is 
weaponry. The increased lethality and range of weapons necessitates a dispersion 
of forces for survival purposes (USMC, 1997a). Offensively, advanced weaponry 
requires less manpower in the battlespace. Defensively, one well-placed munition 
could have devastating effects on military forces.  
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The expanding battlespace places a strain on the ability to sustain 
forces for numerous reasons, distance being the most evident. Longer distances 
require more resources to sustain the logistics elements that provide the necessary 
support to operating units. 
b. Continuing Compression of Reaction Time During 
Operations 
Compression of reaction time refers to the technological advances that 
increase the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of units in battle (USMC, 1997a). This 
increase in OPTEMPO strains the supply chain by increasing the use of sustainment 
items through continuous operations. Increases in OPTEMPO also decrease the 
time to react to logistical requirements and the ability to anticipate these 
requirements due to the ever-changing environment.  
c. A Wide Variety of Missions 
The traditional view of warfare is that of massive land armies fighting in 
lines on a field of battle. The Marine Corps has fulfilled a wide variety of missions 
over time—from direct combat operations to humanitarian assistance. Each mission, 
from one end of the spectrum of operations to the other, requires different types of 
sustainment. To compound the complexity, there is a decreasing time frame in 
transitioning from one mission to another or between simultaneous missions 
throughout the modern-day battlefield (USMC, 1997a). The variety of missions 
necessitates a logistical system with the flexibility and adaptability to meet mission 
requirements. 
d. Expanded Use of Advanced Technology 
The expanded use of technology for the military has allowed for the 
combination of multiple capabilities into one platform. Military jet aircraft are a prime 
example of this, with some aircraft being able to provide air-to-air and air-to-ground 
support from one platform. The increase in the capability of one platform reduces the 
need for overall inventory, placing a greater emphasis on the operability and mission 
readiness of these platforms (USMC, 1997a). Despite reduced inventories of 
capabilities, the oversight and readiness that is demanded of these capabilities put a 
premium on the supply chain that supports them. 
e. Integration of Military Logistics With the Commercial World 
The U.S. military has undergone a recent move to outsource portions 
of military logistics to commercial vendors. This outsourcing provided the military 
with efficiencies that would otherwise go undiscovered due to the capabilities of 
industry (USMC, 1997a). The military requires the correct balance of outsourcing 
and organic logistics in order to be responsive to operations. Although commercial 
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logistics has great capabilities, it must have redundancy to account for contingent 
circumstances and the infrastructure to meet the needs of the military. 
7. Measuring Self-Sufficiency  
The ambiguity of self-sufficiency is further clouded by Marine Corps doctrine’s 
not identifying a metric with which to measure self-sufficiency, possibly due to the 
broad nature of doctrine itself. Self-sufficiency covers many areas and is relative to 
the situation in which it is discussed. Tactical requirements drive the sustainment 
needs of the operational and strategic levels, as seen in Figure 4. To satisfy the 
requirements of the tactical level requires all six functions of logistics. Each of those 
functions measures readiness in different ways, which allows individuals and units to 
be self-sufficient. Within a MAGTF, all four elements (GCE, ACE, CE, CSSE) must 
address the six functions of tactical logistics. By the very nature of the elements’ 
missions, their measure of readiness/self-sufficiency may be different. 
B. MARINE CORPS LITERATURE 
The recent discussion of self-sufficiency throughout the Marine Corps comes 
on the heels of the Marine Corps’ exploration of solving its “liquid logistics” issues 
(Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, n.d.). At the heart of these issues is a 
strong reliance on a few tangible supplies (Class I and III) to conduct day-to-day 
operations, which not only strains the supply train but also leaves the force 
vulnerable to attacks. In this case, the relied-upon tangible supplies are fuel and 
water. The high demands for these items are based on the operating environment 
and increased use of computer-based assets. Due to this periodic requirement of 
fuel and water, supply lines have been easily targeted, resulting in one Marine being 
wounded or killed for every 50 water or fuel resupply convoys (Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Energy Office, n.d.). The purpose of this portion of the literature 
review is not to dissect the specifics of fuel and water efficiencies but rather to 
explore how recent operating environments have affected our understanding of self-
sufficiency. This project uses concepts from recent summit-related discussions 
regarding fuel and water and expound on these concepts to help us define self-
sufficiency as it pertains to Marine Corps operations. 
1. The Current Context 
Over the last 10 years, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have ruled military 
operations. These prolonged wars have taken the Marine Corps away from its 
expeditionary roots of “fast, austere and lethal” (Conway, 2009, p. 6). Through 
fighting a counterinsurgency (COIN), the Marine Corps has become more lethal in its 
means to wage war but has become heavy and slower as it has ventured away from 
its expeditionary roots. The intent of the current CMC, General James Amos, is to 
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bring the Marine Corps back into “balance” by returning to its Spartan roots (Marine 
Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, n.d.). His intent is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The Current State of the Marine Corps With Regard to Its 
Expeditionary Roots 
(Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, n.d., p. 13) 
2. How Did the Marine Corps Get Here? 
The obvious answer to the question “How did the Marine Corps get here?” is 
that the Marine Corps increased their footprint (became less austere) and made the 
load heavier (became slower because of more equipment). What specifically made 
the Marine Corps move away from its expeditionary roots to fight differently? There 
could be several reasons for this. One reason is its continued reliance on and 
enhancements of equipment. 
a. Increased Reliance on Equipment 
The last 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen increased 
enhancements and use of information technologies, command and control systems, 
weapon systems, and force protection measures (Marine Corps Expeditionary 
Energy Office, n.d.). To better illustrate this increased reliance on equipment: In the 
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past 10 years, the Marine Corps has seen a 250% increase in radios, a 300% 
increase in information technology (IT), a 200% increase in the number of vehicles, 
an over 75% increase in vehicle weight, and a 30% decrease in fuel efficiency 
(Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, n.d.). These shifts in assets mean a shift 
in support requirements, making the Marine Corps heavier.  
b. Forward Operating Bases 
The nature of COIN has necessitated the need for Marines to be close 
to the local populace while still maintaining the correct level of force protection. 
Being stationary for long periods of time leads to greater stability within the forward 
operating bases (FOBs) and to a less austere environment by allowing quality-of-life 
items that would otherwise not be allowed due to the nature of offensive combat 
operations. Such items are generators, enhanced communications and command 
and control equipment, as well as tents or hardened encampments.  
c. The Mission 
Ultimately, irregular warfare shaped the way that the Marine Corps 
fought the Global War on Terror. The conflicts were not traditional in the sense of a 
mass-on-mass, uniformed enemy. As a result, the Marine Corps required a change 
in tactics, techniques, and procedures and, in doing so, became resource-intensive 
compared to the traditional way of waging war. 
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The concept of self-sufficiency is dynamic and difficult to frame due to the 
many contexts it can be applied to. In this project, we focus on the self-sufficiency of 
the United States Marine Corps and its relationship with three interdependent 
elements: environment, time, and supply chain (see Figure 6). We chose these 
factors because we determined, upon thorough analysis of the literature, that they 
have the most significant impact on Marine Corps self-sufficiency. 
 
Figure 6. Relationship Among Self-Sufficiency and Its Elements 
Our view of self-sufficiency, as illustrated in Figure 6, proposes that self-
sufficiency is a soft core molded by three elements. As such, the limiting factor (i.e., 
the factor that causes the most strain on self-sufficiency) will “stretch” self-
sufficiency, possibly to the point of breakage. In this chapter, we describe the 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 20 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
elements of environment, time, and supply chain and explain their interrelationship 
to shape self-sufficiency. 
B. DEFINING THE ELEMENTS 
1. Environment 
Environment is the element of self-sufficiency that sets the stage in which 
Marine Corps operations are conducted. There are many different variables that an 
environment may consist of; these variables may include the physical, cultural, 
political, and economic factors that change given a specific scenario. In its simplest 
form, the environment is the who, what, when, where, and why of a given situation. 
For example, 
 Who: an individual Marine, fire team, squad, company, battalion, etc.  
 What: the mission of the “who” and what we are trying to accomplish 
 When: the time of year (e.g., summer, winter) and social constructs 
(e.g., TET OFFENSIVE, EID) 
 Where: country, regional location, and climate (e.g., arid, tropical, 
mountain, desert) 
 Why: the purpose (end state) of military operations 
We further view the environment as a combination of the internal and external 
influences that can impact the ability of a unit to be self-sufficient. We have denoted 
these influences as environmental factors and describe them as follows: 
 Mission: There are many different types of missions that can be 
conducted. These missions include not only offensive and defensive 
operations but also any type of mission that can be conducted across 
the range of military operations. The mission affects the environment 
by providing conditions for a unit to operate within.  
 Location: The location is a physical factor of the environment that 
delineates where a unit is operating. It encompasses physical 
boundaries and distances within an area of operations. It is also the 
basis for other environmental factors such as terrain and weather 
within a given region.  
 Enemy activity: The level of enemy activity is an external factor of a 
given environment that impacts operations. We view this as operating 
within a permissive or non-permissive environment. In a permissive 
environment, there is a very low or nonexistent threat of enemy 
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activity. In a non-permissive environment, there is a very high threat of 
enemy activity.  
 Terrain: The terrain within a specified area of operations is another 
physical factor that impacts the environment. This factor depends on 
the location.  
 Weather: The weather within a region is a physical factor of the 
environment. This is an external factor that cannot be controlled and 
can only be planned for given current meteorological data. 
 Available infrastructure: The available infrastructure within a given 
region is another external factor contributing to the overall 
environment. We consider important infrastructure to be related to 
transportation, energy, water, fuel, and buildings (e.g., roads, ports, 
airfields, railways, power grids, water purification plants).  
 Available natural resources: The available natural resources within a 
region are another external factor within an environment related to self-
sufficiency. These are resources include water, timber, sunlight, 
minerals, and wind. 
Although we can influence the environment or situation somewhat by carefully 
planning military operations, the environment (or situation) is most often a given 
scenario—a state of nature—around which we must plan. Therefore, most of our 
focus and efforts to increase or optimize self-sufficiency should be on the factors of 
time or supply chain. 
2. Time 
In our model, the element of time is a function of three subcomponents: time 
as a function of mission duration (tMD), the time needed to be self-sufficient (tSS), and 
the timing factors of the supporting supply chain (tSC). Time can also be stated as 
follows: Time = ƒ(tMD, tSS, tSC). 
Time as a function of mission duration (tMD) is derived from its relationship 
with the environment element. It is a byproduct of the operational environment, 
denoting the duration of the given/current mission. Simply put, it is how long a unit 
will operate in a certain environment.  
Time as a function of self-sufficiency (tSS) is how long a unit can sustain 
operations without external support. 
Time as a function of supply chain (tSC) denotes the supply chain 
fundamentals related to time: lead time, inventory/DOS, and capacity. Lead time is 
the amount of time elapsed from the time a requirement is generated to the time it is 
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received by the supported unit. Inventory and DOS are the amount of supplies 
carried by the supported unit. Capacity is a physical limitation to the amount of 
inventory or DOS that the supported unit is able to carry. 
Given a certain environment (e.g., OPTEMPO and mission) and supporting 
supply chain, Marine units (regardless of size) can only operate for a finite period of 
time before the logistics chain that supports them will have to provide replenishment 
to continue operations. For example, a Marine unit conducting operations for one 
day will experience a higher level of self-sufficiency than the same unit conducting 
operations over a one-month period. 
3. Supply Chain 
A formal definition of supply chain is “the material and informational 
interchanges in the logistical process stretching from acquisition of raw materials to 
delivery of finished products to the end user. All vendors, service providers and 
customers are links in the supply chain” (Council of Supply Chain Management 
Professionals, 2013). Supply chains are a vital aspect in both commercial and 
military operations. In a commercial supply chain, efficiency is what allows control 
over cost and provides value to the customer. In the military supply chain, efficiency 
assists in controlling the monetary cost but more significant is reducing the human 
cost of casualties and accomplishing the mission.  
There are three attributes associated with military supply chains that affect 
self-sufficiency: responsiveness, flexibility, and sustainability. In military logistics, 
specifically tactical logistics, the military supply chain is responsive in nature. The 
supply chain must operate rapidly and react to an ever-changing operating 
environment to meet the demands of the units being supported. How efficiently a 
supply chain does this is a measure of its responsiveness, or “getting the right goods 
to the right place at the right time” (USMC, 1999, p. 1-6).  
The military supply chain must also be flexible. The flexibility of a supply chain 
is its “ability to adapt logistics structure and procedures to changing situations, 
missions, and concepts of operation” (USMC, 1999, p. 1-6). The environment that 
the military operates in is not static, and neither is the supply chain that supports it. 
As the mission or objective changes, the supply chain must adapt in order to meet 
new demands.  
Another attribute of a military supply chain is sustainability. “Sustainability is 
the ability to maintain logistics support to all users throughout the area of operations 
for the duration of the operation” (USMC, 1999, p. 1-6). The concept of distributed 
operations dictates that the military supply chain must provide sustainable support to 
multiple locations across a growing battlespace. 
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C. INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF ELEMENTS 
In this section, we discuss the interrelationships that exist among the three 
elements of self-sufficiency (see Figure 7). We evaluate first the interaction between 
the environment and the supply chain, then the interaction between time and the 
supply chain, followed by the interaction between the environment and time. 
 
Figure 7. Interrelationships Among the Elements 
1. Environment and Supply Chain 
In military operations, the necessary supplies are determined by the type of 
mission being conducted and the environment that the mission is being conducted 
in. These supplies can be any of the 10 predetermined classes of supply, but the 
quantity and rate in which they are needed are subject to uncertainty. This 
uncertainty exists because of the complex and often changing environment that 
military operations are conducted in. As previously mentioned, the factors affecting 
the environment are 
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 enemy activity, 
 terrain, 
 weather, 
 available infrastructure, and 
 available natural resources. 
The first contributing factor affecting the supply chain environment is the type 
of mission being conducted. The mission type can be one of any across the ROMO, 
from humanitarian assistance to combat operations. Out of the 10 predetermined 
classes of supply, there are certain supplies that will always be needed: water and 
food (Class I), fuel (Class III), and ammunition (Class V). The quantity needed of 
each item is dependent upon the scale of the operation and the time period in which 
the mission is being conducted. 
The second factor impacting the supply chain environment is the location in 
which the mission is being conducted. This is the physical location where forces are 
operating and the forces’ proximity to a logistics supporting element. Current combat 
operations have employed the distributed operations concept where multiple units 
are spread across a geographical region in order to leverage their combat power 
against the enemy. This concept adds complexity to the supply chain that supports it 
because instead of supporting one location, the supply chain must support multiple 
locations at once. Furthermore, the distances between each supported unit can vary 
quite significantly, adding even more complexity. 
The third factor affecting the supply chain environment is the level of enemy 
activity within the operating area. Regardless of what force protection measures we 
take, the enemy always has a choice. Even if there are only a few units that require 
support, the level of enemy activity makes supporting those units much more 
difficult. The military’s supply convoys are a known target for enemy activity and are 
vulnerable to enemy threats. 
The fourth factor affecting the supply chain environment is how the terrain 
affects the supply distribution network. The type of terrain affects the mode of 
transportation required to resupply a unit. In a mountainous region with a poor road 
system, ground transportation may be severely limited. This type of scenario will 
force the distribution network to utilize alternative transportation methods (i.e., air 
transportation). If air transportation is not available, the amount of lead time required 
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to provide support will increase. With a longer lead time, the supported unit is forced 
to carry more on-hand supplies or go without certain items. 
The fifth factor affecting the supply chain environment is the weather or 
climate in which the supply chain is operating. Weather can severely limit the ability 
of the supply chain by limiting its mobility, access to distribution nodes, and 
responsiveness to demand. An example of this can be seen by a sandstorm 
covering a specific area within the operating environment. Due to poor visibility, 
logistical transportation is unable to maneuver by ground or air. This limits the 
access to these specific distribution nodes and may not allow for responsive supply 
for demanded items. 
 Weather can also have an effect on the demand for supplies. In winter, 
demand will include items that increase self-sufficiency during colder temperatures 
and shorter days, while demands during summer will include items necessary for 
warmer temperatures and longer days. Relating to the location and terrain factors, 
depending on where in the world the operations are taking place, the climate of that 
area must be taken into account when trying to increase the self-sufficiency of a unit. 
The sixth factor affecting the supply chain environment is the available 
infrastructure in the area of operations. The available infrastructure affects the 
distribution network of a supply chain and the amount of military resources needed 
to conduct a mission. The distribution network is affected by the quantity and quality 
of the infrastructure available for transportation, such as roads, seaports, rail 
systems, and airfields. A region with poor transportation infrastructure diminishes the 
military supply chain’s ability to import needed supplies from outside the region and 
distribute them across the last tactical mile to the operating forces. 
Other forms of existing and to-be-constructed infrastructure that impact the 
supply chain environment are the facilities available to the operating forces. 
Important facilities to be concerned with in the planning process are the available 
power grid, water purification plants, and oil refineries. Additionally, buildings that 
can be used for multiple purposes, such as medical treatment, dinning, storage, and 
maintenance of equipment, are important as well. 
Without quality transportation and facilities infrastructure, the military supply 
chain must adapt so that it can meet mission requirements. This becomes a 
logistical constraint that adds complications to the supply chain and can result in a 
delay of support to units in need. To overcome this constraint, the military must rely 
upon its own organic capabilities, such as bridge building equipment, combat 
engineers, generators, helicopters, and deployable shelters, to name a few. 
The seventh and final factor affecting the supply chain environment is the 
available natural resources within a region. When discussing the military’s uses of 
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natural resources, the availability of fresh water within a region is a common 
consideration, but not the only one. Other natural resources that can be used as 
alternative energy sources such as solar and wind power are becoming important as 
well. 
Current initiatives, such as the Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office and 
the Experimental Forward Operating Base (EXFOB), are analyzing ways that the 
Marine Corps can utilize alternative energy sources while stationed at home and 
abroad. These initiatives are developing new technologies that utilize alternative 
energy to support Marines around the world. These efforts will decrease the strain 
on the supply chain by reducing the demand for energy- and water-related logistics. 
2. Supply Chain and Time 
The interrelationship between a military supply chain and time (tSC) is best 
explained by using the specific supply chain fundamentals of inventory, lead time, 
safety stock, and capacity. These fundamentals can be applied to both the logistics 
support element and the unit it is supporting. For the purpose of this analysis, we 
apply these fundamentals to a supported operating unit. 
The concept of inventory applied to an operating unit is also known as days of 
supply (DOS). The amount of inventory that an operating unit will carry is determined 
by the following variables: 
 mission duration, 
 lead time for resupply, and 
 (carrying) capacity. 
The mission duration is one variable associated with the amount of inventory 
that a unit will carry. A unit conducting a shorter mission, such as a 12-hour patrol, 
will require much less inventory than a unit conducting a longer mission, such as for 
multiple days. Regardless of the length of the mission, it is obvious that time plays 
an important role in determining the amount of inventory that a unit will carry.  
Lead time is the amount of time elapsed from the time a requirement is 
generated to the time the requirement is received. In the case of an operating unit, 
lead time is the amount of time that it takes to be resupplied from a supporting 
element. Assuming that all required supplies are in stock at the supporting base, the 
amount of lead time is determined by the distance from a supporting base and the 
mode of transportation used for the resupply.  
The distance between an operating unit and its support base is subject to 
variability. Variability exists because operations are not static unless a unit is in a 
prolonged defense. An offensive unit is constantly moving towards its objective and, 
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in many cases, is increasing the distance away from its supporting base. As this 
distance increases, the lead time for resupply increases as well.  
The mode of transportation utilized to resupply a unit and its reliability is 
subject to variability as well. The type of transportation used for resupply is subject 
to the capabilities and resources made available to the supply chain. The 
transportation resources usually made available are in the form of a ground or 
aviation asset. However, both forms of transportation are subject to reliability issues, 
such as mechanical failure, weather, or lack of available infrastructure such as roads 
and airfields. 
To protect against variability in lead time, the concept of safety stock can be 
applied. Safety stock is a quantity of extra stock carried in inventory that is meant for 
protection against variability or uncertainty. Although it is highly unlikely that the term 
safety stock has ever been uttered by a unit leader, unit leaders will prescribe a 
certain level of extra inventory to be carried for unforeseen circumstances. These 
unforeseen circumstances are the previously mentioned variability or uncertainty in 
the supply chain.  
The last variable in the interrelationship between the supply chain and time is 
carrying capacity. This is a physical limitation to the amount of inventory that can be 
stored. In our scenario, carrying capacity is limited to the amount of supplies that can 
be physically carried by a Marine or a vehicle. Capacity, in this case, is a balancing 
act between what can be carried and conducting the mission. Because one of the 
tenets of maneuver warfare is speed and tempo, it would be counterintuitive to 
weigh down an operating force with excess supplies. 
The interrelationship between the military supply chain and time bears some 
similarities to its commercial counterpart. Both supply chains rely on time as a 
measure of responsiveness to the demands of their customers and inventory for 
planning purposes. The key difference between the two supply chains is the extreme 
sense of urgency required in the military supply chain that is absent in the 
commercial supply chain. This urgency is due to the consequences of not meeting a 
demand on time. In the military, not meeting demand can result in mission 
degradation or loss of life. In the commercial world, not meeting demand results in a 
lost sale or lost profit. Not meeting demands is considered unacceptable in both 
supply chains, but the consequences of failure for the military supply chain are much 
direr. 
3. Time and Environment 
Environment drives the relationship between environment and time, with time 
(tMD) being the duration that a unit operates in a given environment. Based on the 
many different variables within an environment, it takes a certain amount of time to 
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complete a mission. The amount of time it takes to accomplish a mission is subject 
to variability. This variability exists because of the previously mentioned factors that 
compose an environment, such as 
 mission, 
 location, 
 enemy activity, 
 terrain, 
 weather, 
 available infrastructure, and 
 available natural resources. 
The severity of each of these factors adds to the complexity of a mission. This 
complexity can then extend the amount of time required to accomplish the mission. 
An example of this can be seen by comparing operations in a permissive and non-
permissive environment. All else equal, a military operation in a permissive 
environment has less complexity than that in a non-permissive environment. This is 
because the level of enemy activity in a permissive environment is very low 
compared to a non-permissive environment. The reduced complexity of the 
permissive environment allows for the unimpeded completion of the mission, and 
thus a lower tMD. 
D. EFFECT OF EACH ELEMENT ON SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
We have now defined each element of self-sufficiency and discussed the 
interrelationships among the elements. In this section, we discuss how self-
sufficiency can be viewed from the perspective of each element.  
1. Environment 
The environment in which Marine units conduct military operations can shape 
the units’ self-sufficiency in many ways. Given a certain supply chain with specific 
capabilities and a time frame within which Marine units desire to be self-sufficient, 
the level of self-sufficiency is influenced largely by the environment in which the units 
operate. For example, a squad-sized unit conducting humanitarian operations in 
Djibouti will require a much different level of self-sufficiency than a company-sized 
unit conducting clearing operations in a highly kinetic, mountainous region of eastern 
Afghanistan. 
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2. Time 
From the perspective of time, the Marine Corps improves self-sufficiency by 
outfitting and resourcing a Marine unit to enable it to remain mission-effective for an 
increased period of time without the need of external assistance from the supporting 
logistics chain. It is incumbent upon leadership to properly prioritize the necessary 
supplies to increase the element of time (and ultimately self-sufficiency) by 
optimizing the value of those necessary items, given mission, space, and weight 
constraints. Also worth noting is the positive correlation between the duration of 
operations and the possibility of emergent circumstances that could hinder a Marine 
unit’s level of self-sufficiency.  
3. Supply Chain  
Another element related to the self-sufficiency of a unit is its reliance on the 
supply chain that supports it. The more self-sufficient an organization becomes, the 
less burden is placed on its supply chain. This increased self-sufficiency allows the 
unit to operate with less complexity and fewer logistical constraints. Although it is 
highly unlikely that any organization can ever be completely self-sufficient, units can 
become more self-sufficient. 
The concept of self-sufficiency can be applied to the military supply chain by 
discussing supply chains in the context of responsiveness, flexibility, and 
sustainability, as mentioned previously. At the tactical level, the military supply chain 
is a response supply chain. It must be able to rapidly react to the demands 
generated by the force that it is supporting. How quickly it reacts is a measure of 
responsiveness. Conversely, if the operating force is more self-sufficient, the supply 
chain would not need to be as responsive. This does not alleviate the supply chain 
of its responsibility to rapidly react to demand. It simply means that the number of 
responses required will decrease because the concept of self-sufficiency reduces 
the collective demand on the supply chain. 
An example of this would be a Marine FOB using solar panels to augment its 
energy requirements. The solar panels reduce the required output of the diesel 
generators. When the amount of power required from the generators is reduced, the 
amount of fuel required to run the generators is reduced as well. This in turn reduces 
the amount of resupply convoys needed to provide fuel to the FOB. 
The flexibility of a supply chain can also be improved by applying self-
sufficiency concepts. A flexible supply chain can adapt to changing situations within 
the environment. The customer in the military supply chain is the unit being 
supported, and as the customer, it is part of the supply chain. By increasing the self-
sufficiency of the supported unit, the unit’s flexibility is increased along with the 
flexibility of the supporting supply chain. The improved flexibility allows both 
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supported and supporting units to better adapt to the changing environment in which 
they operate.  
Sustainability is another characteristic of a supply chain that can benefit from 
self-sufficiency concepts. Sustainability in a military supply chain is the ability to 
maintain logistics support for the duration of the mission. The more self-sufficient a 
unit is, the longer the unit can sustain operations and require less logistical support.  
The supply chain is the element over which we have the most control to 
influence self-sufficiency. The supply chain’s composition, capabilities, and 
relationship with the supported unit(s) are all decisions that are made by some form 
of leadership. Although the supply chain is adapted based on the environment, its 
ability to support and sustain Marine operations increases self-sufficiency by 
decreasing the unit’s need to be totally self-reliant. An effective supply chain allows 
for an increase in duration and intensity of operations. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Our focus during this project was to first define self-sufficiency as it relates to 
the Marine Corps. In order to define self-sufficiency, for our purposes, we stayed 
consistent with the Expeditionary Energy Office’s initiatives for creating a more self-
sufficient force. In our efforts to define self-sufficiency, we first defined the elements 
of self-sufficiency—time, environment, and supply chain—and analyzed how these 
elements interrelate and help shape self-sufficiency. 
Our motivation for this project was guided by the current strategic initiatives to 
decrease the Marine Corps’ reliance on nonrenewable energy and water sources. 
Over the past decade at war, the Marine Corps has grown increasingly reliant on 
fossil fuel and water (i.e., liquid logistics). The Marine Corps’ reliance has increased 
the need for resupply convoys, which have become a critical vulnerability in which 
there is one fatality for every 50 convoys on average.  
We completed this project by conducting an extensive review and analysis of 
applicable military, academic, and commercial literature. We reviewed the applicable 
sources to develop a well-rounded concept of self-sufficiency—as it relates to the 
Marine Corps—and its primary elements. This approach ensured a literature-based 
context for future discussions and projects related to and based on Marine Corps 
self-sufficiency. 
Our initial understanding of the term self-sufficiency was that people or 
organizations were considered to be self-sufficient if they did not require external 
support to sustain life or operations. After analyzing the applicable literature, we 
have determined that this understanding cannot be realistically applied in its entirety 
to the Marine Corps. Marine Corps operations are often complex, requiring support 
from many different activities. It would not be feasible or efficient for a Marine Corps 
unit to attempt to be completely self-sufficient for an infinite period of time.  
Although the Marine Corps may never be completely self-sufficient, it can 
increase its level of self-sufficiency. A unit’s level of self-sufficiency is primarily 
affected by the dynamic relationships among three principal elements: environment, 
time, and supply chain. Each of these elements interacts with each other to either 
increase or decrease the self-sufficient capability of a unit. When a unit’s level of 
self-sufficiency is increased, it becomes less reliant on the supply chain that 
supports it and more focused on accomplishing its mission. Therefore, we have 
defined self-sufficiency, as it relates to the Marine Corps, as a capability that 
depends on the three primary elements of environment, time, and supply chain. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our project breaks down self-sufficiency into three primary elements—
environment, time, and supply chain—to allow for more focused research on how to 
increase or optimize self-sufficiency of Marine Corps units. Our recommendations for 
future research projects are as follows: 
1. The guiding principle for this project was the need for the Marine Corps 
to become more self-sufficient. Our recommendation for future 
research is to establish scalable and appropriate metrics to measure a 
unit’s self-sufficient capability.  
2. The military supply chain has grown increasingly reliant on its ability to 
contract goods and services to provide support for the operating 
forces. Another recommendation for future research is to study the 
relationship between contracting goods and services and their ability to 
enhance a unit’s self-sufficient capability. 
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